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A B S T R A C T
As language (both writing/speech) rapidly changes due to on-going de-
velopments in speech recognition systems, text-to-speech and chat bots, 
this paper focuses on the various attempts to synthesize, and mechanize 
language over time: to submit it to the logical, rational, and mechanical: to 
atomize and/or render it as pure code. This involves looking afresh at the 
kinds of philosophical questions these developments raise with respect to 
language – as a ‘human’ phenomenon – which is increasingly being medi-
ated by technology. The question – what is language when it is made by a 
machine? – touches upon ethical concerns; the notion of linguistic agency, 
and the shifting relationship between language and thought. While at-
tempts at synthesising speech can be traced back as far as Roger Bacon 
(1200s) and Christian Kratzenstein, (1770s) more recent attempts to 
mechanize speech include early 20th c. mechanisms for encoding speech, 
such as the 1939 World’s Fair ‘Parallel Bandpass Vocoder’ and ‘Voder,’ 
(1940). 1 Alan Turing’s work with ‘Universal’ computing languages, and 
their implications for AI, as well as the recent Siri application for the iPhone 
are more recent examples of the move towards forms of language which 
are removed from the body and rendered through code. The claim is that 
such mechanical interventions into language, both foregrounds and prob-
lematizes our relationship with language as a primary human technology. 
This paper proposes that we might want to pay particular attention to the 
changing forms of language as they are experienced/mediated through 
such technologies, and to the implications for identity, human agency and 
the larger ‘moral economies’ they imply.
by
Sheena Calvert
THE CHANGING LANGUAGES OF IMAGE AND TEXT
In a time when the ontologies and ecologies of lan-
guage are being radically challenged by the unstable 
modes of representation posed by the digital, net-
worked environment; and whose very relationship 
to temporality has, according to Johanna Drucker, 
in her essay “Digital Ontologies,” been altered, it 
seems timely, if not essential, to reconsider the 
question of where ‘sense’ or meaning lies in mecha-
nized and digitized language, if it lies at all. 4 The 
word ‘lies’ possesses a dual meaning in this context, 
and in the debates over truth in language, the static 
image of thought via language, as a conduit for verac-
ity has been discredited; increasingly subject to the 
infinite material fluctuations of digital surface[s]. 
Drucker suggests that the most pressing question of 
the digital amounts to: “[T]he basic issue of whether 
an idea can exist outside of instantiation in material 
form with respect to the digital environment.” 5 Her 
remark poses a question about the [im]materiality 
of the digital, and its ephemeral, paradoxical nature: 
both existing and not at the same time; thus unset-
tling our ideas about the identity of both images and 
language, and their status as meaning-full. In turn, 
it leads to us question whether our conception of 
language (whether writing or speech), is profoundly 
Figure 1. Replica of the ‘Acoustic-Mechanical Speech Machine’ by Wolfgang von Kempelen 
(originally produced in 1791 2) by the Department of Phonetics, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, 
Germany, 2007-9. Photo by Fabian Brackhane (Quintatoen), 2008. Kempelen’s Speaking Machine 
directly followed the seminal work by Russian Professor Christian Kratzenstein who had made 
apparatus to artificially produce thus explain the physiological differences between five long vowels 
(/a/, /e/, /i/, /o/, and /u/). 3 These attempts to produce the sounds of human speech were the 
precursors of modern electrical/digital speech synthesis. Used with permission via the Creative 
Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.
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changed by its capacity to be stored as digital code? 
If traditional forms of photography have entered into 
what Ken Hollings calls a pathological phase – wherein 
the digital, networked image and the movement and 
distribution of images is more significant than any 
content ‘in’ the image, undermining any of its aesthetic 
or semantic properties, then this question of where 
‘sense’ or meaning is located in the image becomes 
further accentuated and complex, and this also applies 
to language whose move towards code suggests that 
its very meaning as an expression of human thought 
and identity needs to be reconsidered. As Ken Hollings 
remarked: 
[T]hanks to the digital camera, we don’t take pho-
tographs anymore but generate social networks 
instead – [what] we call photography is a patho-
logical condition and has suffered greatly from be-
ing regarded as an ‘art form’ for so long, and might 
never recover.” 6
The trajectory of both Drucker and Hollings’ questions 
accelerates to a remark about the identity and status 
of language[s] in general (whether visual or linguistic) 
when they move to the material/immaterial space of 
the digital. The ways in which we store, access, and 
distribute photographs is, by analogy, of real impor-
tance here. Rarely printed, and frequently residing in 
the ‘cloud,’ personal photography in particular, would 
suggest that the status of photographs has so radically 
changed in the current context as to be indescribable 
within any prior system of sign/signified, true/false, or 
traditional indexicality. The ‘sickness’ from which both 
photography and language suffer is perhaps rooted in 
their inability to accommodate or bend to any alterna-
tive systems of meaning required by new digital con-
texts. An alternative system of meaning would need 
to take into account both photography and language’s 
altered circumstances, caused by their proliferation 
within digital environments and ephemeral social 
spaces, and the accompanying challenges to their 
ontologies. These new modes of production and dis-
tribution require different philosophical ‘moves’ to ac-
commodate the nebulous, networked, dematerialized 
contexts we find both images and language operating 
in. Ken Hollings offers the insight that:
[T]hanks to the digital camera, we don’t take pho-
tographs anymore but generate social networks 
instead – [what] we call photography is a patho-
logical condition and has suffered greatly from be-
ing regarded as an ‘art form’ for so long, and might 
never recover. 7
The consequent dematerialisation of language can be 
seen to extend all the way to Artificial Language, with 
its reduction to units of code, removing it further and 
further from the body and from the human agent. This 
collapsing of the space between the mechanical and 
the linguistic, their entwining, raises important ethical 
questions about the continued role of language as a 
phenomenon which shapes what it is to ‘be’ human, 
and to possess an identity through language, or indeed 
to ‘think.’ Language and the subject are differently 
configured in the world of AI and synthetic speech, re-
quiring a different philosophy of language to account 
for these changes. The ethical status of language is in 
question when machine-made, and while all language 
could be argued to be a technology, the increasing 
mediation of advanced technologies shifts the ethical 
and ontological framework of language further than 
ever before. This is partly due to the increasing ubiq-
uity of such languages, which have moved out of the 
world of relatively arcane scientific experimentation, 
and into the everyday.
The Origins of Language-as-Code
The desire to mechanize language and render it coter-
minous with both the ideas and practical realities of 
machines, has a long history, reaching all the way back 
to the Enlightenment, and earlier. Language, as the 
primary interface between us, and the ‘out there,’ was 
and continues to be, a source of mistrust; the locus of 
a frequently troubling level of subjectivity, wherein hu-
man agents are the carriers of meaning, and disruptive 
potential, constituting an anarchy of articulation, which 
is seen as needing to be managed and contained. We 
can see the roots of such anxieties in the practice of 
philosophy itself, as explained by Ian Hacking:
One reason why language matters to philosophy 
and not to Zoology is that philosophers are often 
concerned with domains where our common ways 
of thinking and arguing lead us not to clarity and a 
satisfactory technical language, but rather to ambi-
guity, equivocation, contradiction, and paradox. 8 
The problem for philosophers is that the same word 
can have many meanings (Thomas Hobbes called this 
the “inconstancy” of language 9) and such ambiguity is 
seen to lead to confusion between concepts, whereby 
a perversion of judgement takes place. To counter this 
(and as a precursor to later work by Gottfried Wilhelm 
von Leibniz), Baruch Spinoza, John Wilkins, 10 along 
with Francis Bacon proposed that a ‘mathematical’ ap-
proach to language be adopted; one in which clear and 
unambiguous definitions of terms were agreed::
Although we think we govern our words… certain 
it is that words, as a Tater’s bow, do shoot back 
upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily 
entangle and pervert the judgment. So it is almost 
necessary, in all controversies and disputations, to 
imitate the wisdom of mathematicians, in setting 
down in the very beginning the definition of our 
terms... 11
The notion of language as instrumental, as something 
which should be removed from the human body and 
its propensity for the kind of sensual subjectivity which 
creates ambiguity, is a precursor to symbolic logic and 
analytic philosophy. Philosophers such as Wilkins and 
Leibniz have historically attempted to treat language 
as highly mechanised instruments of thought, through 
the construction of a ‘mathesis’ or, in Leibniz’s term, 
a “Characteristica Universalis,” 12 which attempts 
to suppress languages’ expressive dimensions in fa-
vour of hard logic. John Wilkins (1668), in An Essay 
Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Lan-
guage, is one of the first to attempt to outline a new 
‘universal’ language. He says:
If to every thing and notion there were assigned 
a distinct Mark, together with some provision to 
express Grammatical Derivations and Inflexions; 
this might suffice as to one great end of a Real 
Character, namely, the expression of our Concep-
tions by Marks which should signify things, and 
not words. And so likewise if several distinct words 
were assigned for the names of such things, with 
certain invariable Rules for all such Grammatical 
Derivations and Inflexions, and such only as are 
natural and necessary; this would make a much 
more easy and convenient Language than is yet in 
being. 13
Wilkins goes on to say:
By now if these Marks or Notes could be so con-
trived, as to have such a dependance upon, and 
relation to, one another, as might be suitable to the 
nature of things and notions which they represent-
ed; and so likewise, of the Names of things could be 
so ordered, as to contain such a kind of affinity or 
opposition in their letters and sounds, as might be 
some way answerable to the nature of the things 
which they signified. This would be a farther ad-
Figure 2. Faber and the Euphonia is a Victorian illustration of 
Joseph Faber’s “Speech Organ” from 1846. Image posted by 
Erin at the Dead Media Archive, 2010. Used with permission 
via the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 
Unported license.
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vantage superadded: by which, besides the best way 
of helping the Memory by natural Method, the Un-
derstanding likewise would be highly improved; and 
we should, by learning the Character and the Names 
of things, be instructed likewise in their Natures, the 
knowledge of both which ought to be conjoined. For 
the accurate effecting of this, it would be necessary, 
that the Theory it self, upon which such a design 
were to be founded, should be exactly suited to the 
nature of things. But, on supposal that this Theory 
is defective, either as to the Fulness or the Order of 
it, this must needs add much perplexity to any such 
Attempt, and render it imperfect. And that this is the 
case with that common Theory already received, 
need not much be doubted; which may afford some 
excuse as to several of those things which may seem 
to be less conveniently disposed of in the following 
Tables, or Schemes proposed in the next part. 14
It is clear from these remarks, that Wilkins himself had 
doubts about the validity and ‘perfectibility’ of such a 
project, which relied upon an exact and natural corre-
spondence between marks and objects/concepts. Such 
a closing of the gap between word and object, required 
a leap of faith. He explains that while notions are agreed 
upon, their expression in marks or sounds is not (they 
are arbitrarily assigned).
However, as Louis Couturat has pointed out, Leibniz 
criticized such linguistic systems for their concerns 
with:
[P]ractical uses rather than scientific utility, that is, 
for being chiefly artificial languages intended for 
international communication and not philosophical 
languages that would express the logical relations of 
concepts. 15
Within Leibniz’s advocated form of rationality and ab-
stract thinking, promoted by the creation of an entirely 
artificial symbolic language such as his “Characteris-
tica Universalis,” ideas are assigned a single symbol, 
and rules are established for their combinations 
and use, such that “all abstract reasoning would be 
reduced to mere algebraic calculations” 16 with the 
result that the errors and uncertainty associated 
with the figurative, shifting, imaginative language 
of ordinary discourse are eliminated, in favour of 
an emergent form of artificial language which sup-
presses the sensual. Words, which are assigned a 
precise technical meaning, stand not for themselves, 
but for concepts. As Stuart Hampshire explains: 
“Words or symbols within mathematics do not derive 
their meaning from the images which may be used to 
illustrate them, but stand for clearly defined concep-
tions.” 17 The system emulates pure, mathematical 
reasoning: clear, unambiguous, abstract, error-free, 
and for Leibniz: “Words are logical counters which 
have a purely intellectual significance, [they] stand in 
this sense for clear and distinct ideas,” 18 that offer 
an alternative to a language shot through with error 
and uncertainty; one wholly unsuited to the rational-
ist doctrine. Leibniz continues:
If one could find the characters or symbols to 
express all our thoughts as cleanly and exactly 
as arithmetics expresses numbers, or as analytic 
geometry expresses lines, one could do the same 
as one can do with arithmetics and geometry, 
as much as they are subject to reasoning. This is 
because all investigations that depend on reason-
ing would take place through the transposition of 
these characters, and by a kind of calculus. 19
 In these historical examples, it’s clear that language is 
to be progressively removed from the sensual arena; 
one which is subjectively conditioned by the human 
being who utters and/or writes, and is instead to be 
rendered code-like and mechanical: ‘tamed’ by rea-
son and logic. 
Formal Logic as Artificial Language
Georg W. Hegel said: “That the subject matter of logic 
is thought, with that everyone agrees.” 20 Richard 
Schusterman more recently counters with: “The phi-
losopher cannot award the sole birthright by mere 
logical analysis for there seem to be rival logics gov-
erned by different aims.” 21 Schusterman suggests 
that logic per se is not the only form in which thinking 
takes place, but this notion is persistent throughout 
the history of philosophy. The projects of Wilkins 
and Leibniz, can be broadly contextualised within the 
traditions of logical analysis, as a specific aspect of 
philosophy, and be seen as both a precursor to, and 
extension of it. We might see logic as the prototype 
form of artificial language, wherein its functionality is 
so detached from the human and the sensual as to be 
mechanized and reduced to small units akin to code. 
Language in this context is instrumental, dehuman-
ised, decontextualized: a set of abstract placeholders 
for any real world events. Logic is the science and 
practice of rational thinking. It determines something, 
and asserts (predicates) about that something, in the 
pursuit of truth or validity. It does this purely through 
language as an instrumental phenomenon. Martin Hei-
degger remarks: 
Of its own accord, a determining so understood 
tries to measure up to that about which the state-
ment is made. The measuring up to that about 
which the determination and statement are made, 
the adequatio, characterizes what we generally 
mean by the truth of statements. Aoyos, can be 
adequate or inadequate, true or false. 22
Aristotle locates truth in correspondence, or in other 
words, in the identity between objects and concepts 
(in their quality of ‘matching’). 23 This concept of 
truth as a set of correspondences grounded in lan-
guage, and requiring a perceiving subject, is repeated 
in Thomas Aquinas, 24 Leibniz, and later in Immanuel 
Kant, who inherits the traditional concept of truth, 
while introducing new concepts of “subject,” “know-
ing,” and “judgment.” 25 Ludwig Wittgenstein stated: 
“The correspondence or non-correspondence of 
[a proposition] with reality constitutes its truth or 
falsity.” 26 In all versions, truth and correspondence, 
subject (mind) and object, and the search for identity, 
not difference (which would invite contradiction) are 
assumed, actively pursued, and considered intrinsic to 
method, whose ‘ground’ is this very search for corre-
spondence or identity. 27 
Traditional (formal) logic is grounded in, and requires, 
a belief in the physical determinism (positivity) of lan-
guage, aligned with fixed notions of time and space. 
It demonstrates and infers ‘valid/invalid’ outcomes, 
based on the formal deployment of language within 
rule-bound systems of subject-predicate (syllogistic), 
or symbolic form (on/off, right/wrong, yes/no: all root-
ed in binary thinking). In the Tractatus Logico-Philo-
sophicus, Wittgenstein takes logic to be the principal 
‘ground’ of both language and the world “Logic per-
vades both reality and how we apprehend reality. To 
pass beyond its limits, the limits alike of language and 
world, is to speak non-sense.” 28 In his essay “Some 
Remarks on Logical Form,” Wittgenstein outlines the 
principles of Logical Positivism, which Bertrand Rus-
sell had earlier proposed. 29 He explains how every 
proposition has both a content and a form, but that 
the ‘pure’ form is only available to us if we abstract 
from the meanings of individual words. What counts 
is not solely word-level semantics; logic must account 
for variables, which are subject to the same syntacti-
cal constraints as the constants. Logic must also avoid 
the trap which ordinary [natural] language falls into, 
of being able to construct seemingly sensible state-
ments that, on closer inspection, are revealed to be 
“pseudopropositions.” 30 These might involve phrases 
such as “the Real, though it is an in itself, must also be 
able to become a for myself,” 31 effectively rendering 
large portions of philosophical discourse meaningless. 
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Propositions can be reduced to what Wittgenstein 
terms ‘atomic’ elements, where more or less complex 
arrangements of words and sentences containing em-
bedded propositions, ‘logical sums’ or truth functions 
are progressively stripped away to reveal the most 
reductive, bare, minimal form, underlying the various 
material instances of language:
We must eventually reach the ultimate connection 
of the terms, the immediate connection which can-
not be broken, without destroying the propositional 
form as such. They, then, are the kernels of every 
proposition, they contain the material, and all the 
rest is only a development of this material. 32
The proper task of a theory of knowledge, accord-
ing to Wittgenstein, is to find these extra-linguistic, 
‘atomic’ facts (which can be thought of broadly as 
spatio-temporal events) and to make clear how they 
are constructed out of, or made possible by, the words 
or symbols of material language. Wittgenstein seeks 
to establish a hierarchy of linguistic significance, in 
which the material event of language is subordinate 
to the formal structures of language. His difficulty is in 
finding a method for excluding what he feels are the 
endless misunderstandings which plague ordinary lan-
guage (its stubborn indeterminacy), while allowing for 
‘pure’ form to reveal itself – abstracted from language 
as such. The answer he proposes is a symbol system 
which exchanges ordinary language for unambigu-
ous, singular, and precise symbolic representations, 
which in turn provide a clear image of the logical 
structure. 33 However, in a further complication, this 
‘atomic’ form cannot be seen, nor can it be predicted 
(a-priori).
Ordinary language poses the primary relation of lan-
guage (and logic) as subject-predicate based, but this 
leads to an unwelcome generality, a lack of precision, 
which denies the fullness of the abstraction it seeks to 
express. Phrases participating in the subject-predicate 
form offer no more precise opportunities for draw-
ing conclusions than that they share this form. For 
instance, “I am lazy” and “the weather is fine” share 
no common content, only the same subject-predicate 
form of organization. Their content has no guaranteed 
character of correspondence; it’s unclear how they 
could be deployed as a means to attain knowledge of 
the ‘pure’ facts of language.
The situation is further complicated by the sheer 
multiplicity of the world-phenomena which logical 
translation meets with, one which requires a logical 
form capable of embracing this multiplicity, and which 
simultaneously possesses the same breadth in its 
own formal architecture and system. Wittgenstein de-
scribes how a ‘pure’ logical language must encounter 
and consist of:
[T]he whole manifold of special and temporal 
objects, as colours, sounds, etc., etc., with their gra-
dations, continuous transitions, and combinations 
in various proportions, all of which we cannot seize 
by our ordinary means of expression. 34
The conclusion he comes to is that ordinary language 
is to be replaced in logical formations by numbers 
(rational or irrational), since numbers alone have the 
ability to represent “atomic propositions” 35 while en-
tering into their very structure; becoming an integral 
part of the architecture of the expression in a way 
unavailable to ordinary language.
In In other examples, for Noam Chomsky, 36 the 
symbols of a formal language are meaningless in 
themselves. In such formal languages, meaning is 
based solely on position and relation within a system. 
Logical language is understood as a series of axioms 
and variables, whose application within the system can 
be applied universally and confer meaning by virtue of 
their position alone. This ‘formal’ system of language 
and philosophy held that the ambiguities of ordinary 
language were unsuitable for doing precise conceptual 
analysis and so language had to first be translated 
into a formal language to which mathematical logic 
could apply. This language would be logically clear and 
precise or ‘pure.’ Similarly, Willard V. Quine offered the 
following thought: “To be is to be the value of a vari-
able.” 37 Apart from the ontological commitment this 
statement involves, it also demonstrates how Quine’s 
philosophy of language holds that the objects of lan-
guage (words, utterances) are to be understood as a 
series of axioms and variables, which are meaningless 
in themselves, but whose application within the sys-
tem can be applied universally, attaining meaning with 
respect to position alone.
All ‘formal/symbolic’ systems of logic hold that the 
ambiguities (and ‘intensities’) of ordinary language are 
unsuitable for doing precise conceptual analysis, and 
so language first has to be translated into a formal lan-
guage to which a rigorous ‘mathematical’ logic could 
apply. Language would be rendered logically clear and 
precise or ‘pure’ as a result of this operation. – George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnston state:
Scientific (or philosophical) theories are systems of 
axioms in mathematical logic, where the symbols 
are meaningless and need to be interpreted in 
terms of set-theoretical models…Technically, a 
logical form in itself is meaningless-just a group of 
symbols … A formal language needs to be inter-
preted to be meaningful. 38
Such ‘mathematical’ languages are distinct from natu-
ral languages (‘formal’ versus ‘everyday’ language) 
and the underlying assumption (shared by Chomsky 
and others) is that for language to be precise and 
scientifically rigorous, it is essential to theorize from 
within such a formal system. In other words, within 
logic, it is not possible to see meaning in the symbols 
themselves, but only in the relations between those 
symbols. In them, syntax is independent of semantics, 
and these are a consequence of a-priori philosophical 
assumptions about the relation between language and 
thought, language and self, and language to its-self: its 
identity. It follows automatically that to engage with 
such languages, and the theories that encircle them, 
is to accept the world-view they partake of, and that 
they in turn reinforce. Logic represents the ultimate 
move to make language mechanical and subservient 
to the requirements of function. It detaches language 
from the human and suggests that its formal archi-
tecture is its predominant feature. In making language 
‘artificial’ and unbound from the subject who speaks 
and writes, it further participates in the removal of 
language from the body, and lays the ground for the 
on-going elimination of intimacy and nuance in lan-
guage as a phenomenon, which is created by, and for, 
human beings.
Language now becomes a technical instrument, part 
of the technologization of the world, which Heidegger 
warned against the dangers of. 39 This kind of logical 
analysis most properly belongs to science, and marks 
the moment when philosophy becomes a form of re-
ductive technical and formal thinking.
Subjectivity and Universal Language
Michel Foucault, in The Thought from Outside, argued 
that language is empty form, in much the way that log-
ic suggests. We fill it with subjectivity, but it pre-exists 
us, as a series of generic, non-particular entities. The ‘I’ 
becomes our identity, but one born of an empty pro-
noun which lies in wait for a subject to utter it. “Fated 
to speak, then, and to have power over speech. But 
only by taking over and animating the empty forms of 
language. Forms, concepts, that pre-exist the subject 
and will outlive it.” 40 Only a determinate subject can 
animate the ‘I,’ we speak, we blog, we confess, we 
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network, we dis/connect, through a language, which 
waits to be directed to a content. As Foucault reminds 
us, language, in itself, has an existence which is prior to 
its directedness, prior to its role in communication. It 
lies in wait, for a subject to inhabit it. The primary ‘I’ of 
language is impersonal, arbitrary, indifferent; a kind of 
mechanical ‘prior’ to language, which requires human 
agency to shape it into language in itself; returning it 
to the agency of human beings. However, these ideas 
are complicated by the contemporary technological, 
environment and the on-going proliferation of artificial 
languages, speech recognition systems and synthetic, 
coded forms of language.
On September the 9th 2011, an article appeared in the 
online Telegraph 41 outlining an experiment in which 
two science students had set up a randomized con-
versation between a pair of Chatbots (online avatars/
robots). These entities usually converse with a human 
being, but the experiment involved them speaking 
with one another (the discussion quickly turned to 
the existence of God). These synthetic voices lack the 
timbre and richness of the human voice: their tim-
ing is fractionally, but significantly out of synch. What 
became compelling was observing where the break-
points came in that staggered, awkward exchange; 
how the logic of argument quickly broke down, and 
the nuances and subtleties of conversational form 
were lost; how ‘inhuman’ it was, without being able 
to explain exactly why. It’s a reminder that so much of 
communication is in the gaps, the spaces, the inter-
stices, in the non-informational attributes of language; 
in the subtleties of timing and the association with the 
subject who speaks. Expression in language is rever-
beration, resonance. It’s the unmediated, one might 
almost say erotic dimensions of language which we 
miss in mechanized speech: its non-representational, 
libidinal form. We miss its intimacy and connection to 
the attributes of a language, which emanates from 
the body. Language is much more than simple point-
for-point communication, while as Friedrich Nietzsche 
in The Will to Power pointed out, thinking itself is an 
infinitely more complicated affair, happening at, or be-
yond limits of apprehension: 
Causality eludes us; to suppose a direct causal link 
between thoughts, as logic does – that is the con-
sequence of the crudest and clumsiest observation. 
Between two thoughts, all kinds of affects play 
their game: but their motions are too fast, there-
fore we fail to recognize them, we deny them. 42
Emulated speech, sampled from the various tonalities 
of voice, never manages to feel unshackled from its 
mechanical, coded foundations, and in turn its roots in 
pre and post enlightenment attempts to render lan-
guage mechanical and abstract are exposed. 
While the Situationist International, in 1963, wrote: 
“Under the control of power, language always desig-
nates something other than authentic experience,” 43 
Bell Labs were automating the human voice, 44 forc-
ing a new space to open up between writing and 
speech, in the poetry of code; one as fundamentally 
detached from authentic experience as it is possible 
to be. This new relation between language and experi-
ence, between the subject and language, has only just 
begun to be understood. Meanwhile, most of us in-
stinctively flee from the automated voice, rejecting the 
cold, dispassionate, pseudo-communication of coded 
speech. Maurice Blanchot offers the following insight: 
When When two people speak together, they 
speak not together, but each in turn: one says 
something, then stops, the other something else 
(or the same thing), then stops. The coherent 
discourse they carry on is composed of sequences 
that are interrupted when the conversation moves 
from partner to partner...The power of speaking 
interrupts itself, and this interruption plays a role 
which appears to be minor – precisely the role of 
subordinated alternation. This role, nonetheless, is 
so enigmatic that it can be interpreted as bear-
ing the very enigma of language: pause between 
sentences, pause from one interlocutor to another, 
and pause of attention, the hearing that doubles 
the force of locution. 45
Tone, timing, emphasis, modulation – these are all tiny, 
intramundane, but essential pointers to the ‘human’ 
in language, where tone of voice, pacing, and empha-
sis is everything. We can tell an entire story with the 
nuances and inflections of our speech, and with the 
spaces between elements. Space and time are es-
sential components of language, and conversation is 
where we experience the full force of this dynamic. 
In conversation, a pause designates the distinction 
between two statements. Someone starts to speak, 
and is interrupted by another or, pauses voluntarily to 
allow the other to speak. By virtue of the voluntary 
or enforced interruption of the stream of words, the 
silence of the one becomes the ground of the other. 
Differently put: a space is created whereby another 
voice can enter the language stream and be heard: “In-
terruption happens for the sake of understanding,” 46 
which amounts to saying that the void is as important, 
if not more so, than speech itself.
But where, in this temporal structure, does true listen-
ing happen? Is conversation, conceived of as an equi-
table proposition really possible or simply an illusion? 
In the space which allows another voice to be heard, 
is there listening/hearing/ understanding or just wait-
ing? Given the shortness of time between the ‘some-
thing said’ of the one and the response of the other, 
how much thought can we realistically give to what 
others say? Before we respond, have we really heard? 
It’s not just about the structure of time and space in 
language, but a matter of intention, and intention is a 
human attribute. 
Artificial voice recognition systems are ubiquitous in 
the technological world of late, the Siri application, 47 
automated phone systems and robots, come close to 
human speech, but they never replicate conversation 
as we understand it. Despite a somewhat uncanny-
inducing near proximity to conversation, complete 
with carefully intonated responses, the absence of a 
human subject is ultimately unsettling, and unfulfilling. 
You know that the disembodied series of synthesized 
sounds, or recorded and processed ‘voice’ on the 
other end of the phone is ‘listening’ but not hearing. 
There is no comprehension, only a series of pre-
programmed responses: an absence, which brings the 
nature of ‘conversation’ sharply into focus. As Witt-
genstein said: “In a conversation: one person throws a 
ball; the other does not know whether he is supposed 
to throw it back, or throw it to a third person, or leave 
it on the ground, or pick it up and put it in his pocket, 
etc.” 48
We can convey disinterest, annoyance, empathy and 
control through such conversational nuances. How can 
coded language simulate these types of intramundane 
details of our interactions? They require a sensitive 
and attuned human agent, to be constantly reading for 
signals, and a feedback system to be in place, which 
allows for the subtle interplay between signs and re-
sponses, space for error and adjustment, and the abil-
ity to inhabit multiple timings. Understanding is found 
in the far-from-seamless flow of such interactions, it’s 
not a question of communication, but of ‘listening’ and 
‘hearing’ differently, and of a heightened sensitivity to 
the most miniscule deviations from the basic structure 
of the message being conveyed.
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CONCLUSION
Having reviewed some of the many attempts to 
mechanize language over time, and considered how 
this endeavour has removed language from the human 
subject and the body that produces it, the question 
finally becomes: which philosophical questions about 
language remain the same, and which change, once 
we enter these new linguistic contexts? Of course, the 
politics of information as it is expressed through lan-
guage as its agent, is never far from these questions. 
In 1963 and 1966 respectively, the Situationist Inter-
national and Mustapha Khayati published two articles 
on language and power within the magazine Interna-
tionale Situationniste. The first, entitled “All the King’s 
Men” . 49 offers a stark reminder of the ways in which 
language, in the grasp of authoritarian forces, does 
damage to the authenticity of human experience, by 
always designating something ‘other,’ in the servic-
ing of capitalist ideology. The second essay: “Captive 
Words: Preface to a Situationist Dictionary” . 50 goes 
further, in claiming that, as with René Descartes’ pro-
posal for a “Mathesis Universalis,” 51 thought is in dan-
ger of becoming subordinate to mathematical rigor, 
stripped of its insubordinate, poetic potential. Both 
texts reiterate the Situationist theme of resistance to 
such power moves by proposing a language, liberated 
from its role as information and which recognizes and 
harnesses the fact that: “[Words] are not completely 
automated: unfortunately for the theoreticians of 
information, [they] are not in themselves ‘information-
ist;’ they contain forces that can upset the most care-
ful calculations.” . 52
In these fluid, mobile, immaterial contexts, grounded 
in coded speech and human-to-machine and machine-
to-human translations, we need new ways of thinking 
through questions of what language ‘is.’ We need 
to philosophize about it differently, in a digital space 
and time, to take account of the on-going removal 
of language from the human, and the increasingly 
blurred lines between ourselves and the machines 
that produce it. These are ethical questions as well as 
philosophical ones, and they are in turn deeply rooted 
in the politics of language: 
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather 
a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to 
mean – neither more nor less.’ ‘The question is,’ said 
Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.’ ‘The question is,’ said Humpty 
Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that’s all.’ 53 ■
 
refereNceS aNd NoteS
1. “At the 1939 World’s Fair a machine called a Voder was 
shown. A girl stroked its keys and it emitted recognisable 
speech. No human vocal cords entered into the procedure 
at any point; the keys simply combined some electronically 
produced vibrations and passed these on to a loud-speak-
er.” Vannevar Bush, “As We May Think,” in The Atlantic 
Monthly, 1945, 94. For photographic documentation also 
see: http://www.davidszondy.com/future/robot/voder.htm 
(assessed October 20th 2013)
2. John P. Cater, Electronically Speaking: Computer Speech 
Generation, (Indianapolis: Howard M. Sams & Co., 1983), 
72.
3. For details see Haskin’s Laboratories, science of the 
spoken word page: http://www.haskins.yale.edu/featured/
heads/SIMULACRA/kratzenstein.html (assessed October 
20th 2013)
4. Johanna Drucker, “Digital Ontologies: The Ideality of Form 
in/and Code Storage: Or: Can Graphesis Challenge Mathe-
sis?,” Leonardo 34, no. 2 (2001): 141-145.
5. Ibid., 141.
6. Ken Hollings, email exchange with the author, November 
2012.
7. Ken Hollings, “Requiem for the Network,” in Essay 5 (2011).
8. Hacking shows, a number of contemporary philosophers 
such as Gilles Deleuze, Walter Benjamin and Jacques Der-
rida will claim that the opposite is true, and that ambiguity, 
equivocation, contradiction, and paradox, are precisely 
where meaning is located; not in clarity and technical 
precision. See: Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter 
to Philosophy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1975), 5.
9. Thomas Hobbes, “Of Speech: Abuses of Speech,” The 
Leviathan (reprinted from the edition of 1651), ed. W.G. 
Pogson Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
Chapter IV.
10. The “Mathesis Universalis” is a proposal to create a univer-
sal science (and associated language based on the same 
principles), which would eliminate errors of reasoning. The 
original conception can be attributed to René Descartes. 
Cf. Frederick P. Van de Pitte, “Descartes’ Mathesis Univer-
salis,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Volume 61, 
Issue 2 (2009):154–174. The idea is later associated with 
Leibniz and John Wilkins in the works cited elsewhere in 
this section of the paper.
11. From Francis Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning, cited 
in Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, 6.
12. We might further attempt to tease out the details of the 
relationships between such mathematical languages and 
Enlightenment reasoning through a review of the work 
of those philosophers such as Leibniz, who attempted to 
create a “Characteristica Universalis,” in 1677; a universal 
language, which would eliminate the errors associated with 
natural languages. This consisted of what he called “... a 
kind of general algebra in which all truths of reason would 
be reduced to a kind of calculus. At the same time, this 
would be a kind of universal language or writing, though 
infinitely different from all such languages which have thus 
far been proposed; for the characters and the words them-
selves would direct the mind, and the errors – excepting 
those of fact – would only be calculation mistakes. It would 
be very difficult to form or invent this language or charac-
teristic, but very easy to learn it without any dictionaries.” 
Cf. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, On The Art of Combination, 
1666, translated in Parkinson 1966: 10–11, and Leibniz, let-
ter to Nicolas Remond, 10 January 1714, in Loemker 1969: 
654. Translation revised. 
13. John Wilkins, An Essay Towards a Real Character and a 
Philosophical Language (John Martin, Printer to the Royal 
Society, London, 1668), 21.
14. Ibid. Note: original italics and capitalization retained, 
language modernized as necessary i.e. easie to ‘easy,’ onely 
to ‘only.’ 
15.  Louis Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz (Paris: Felix Alcan, 
1901), 201.
16. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (London: Pelican, 1951), 21.
17. Ibid., 20.
18. Ibid.
19. Leibniz further states: “I should still hope to create a kind 
of universal symbolistic [spécieuse générale] in which all 
truths of reason would be reduced to a kind of calculus. At 
2 9 0 2 9 1
L E O N A R D O E L E C T R O N I C A L M A N A C  V O L  1 9  N O  4 I S S N  1 0 7 1 - 4 3 9 1       I S B N  9 7 8 - 1 - 9 0 6 8 9 7 - 2 6 - 0 I S S N  1 0 7 1 - 4 3 9 1       I S B N  9 7 8 - 1 - 9 0 6 8 9 7 - 2 6 - 0 V O L  1 9  N O  4  L E O N A R D O E L E C T R O N I C A L M A N A C
A R T I C L EA R T I C L E
the same time this could be a kind of universal language or 
writing, though infinitely different from all such languages 
which have thus far been proposed, for the characters and 
the words themselves would give directions to reason, and 
the errors – except those of fact – would be only mistakes 
in calculation.” Leibniz, From a letter to Nicholas Raymond, 
654.
20. Georg W. Hegel, Science of Logic (London: Routledge, 
2004).
21. Richard Schusterman, Surface and Depth, Dialectics of 
Criticism and Culture (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2002), 86. 
22. Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Indi-
ana: Indiana University Press, 1984), 2.
23. Cf. Aristotle, ‘The Interpretations,’ The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), vol. 1.
24. Aquinas said: “Truth is a ‘correspondence between intel-
lect [mind/soul] and thing.” Quaestiones Disputatae De 
Veritate, QI, Art. I.
25. Kant said: “What is truth? The nominal definition of truth, 
namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its 
object, is both granted and presupposed.” Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A58. 
26. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus 
(London: Routledge, 2001), §T2.222. First published in 
Wilhelm Ostwald’s Annalen der Naturphilosophie, 1921. 
27. Martin Heidegger will later inquire into the nature and 
meaning of this reliance on correspondence or identity, by 
re-posing it as a relation (mediation/translation) between 
two ‘somethings’ (mind/object, statement/reality, etc.). 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: HarperOne, 
1962).
28. David Silverman and Brian Torode, The Material Word: 
Some Theories of Language and its Limits (London: 
Routledge, 1980), 51.
29. In the 1929 essay “Some Remarks on Logical Form,” Witt-
genstein outlines the principles of Logical Atomism which 
Bertrand Russell had earlier proposed in The Principles 
of Mathematics (London: W.W. Norton, 1937. First edition 
1903) and in his 1918 lectures, which were later published 
as “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” in Logic and 
Knowledge (Macmillan, New York: 1956). In “Some Remarks 
on Logical Form,” Wittgenstein explains how “every propo-
sition has both a content and a form. We get the picture of 
the pure form if we abstract from the meaning of the single 
words.” See: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Aristotelian Society 9 
(1929): 1. Reprinted in – Readings in the Philosophy of Lan-
guage, ed. Peter Ludlow (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 209.
30. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein makes 
the claim that each and every proposition can be reduced 
down to its most elementary facts, which in turn can be 
referred to states of affairs in the world. In this way, he 
claims that the truth as a consequence of the irreducibility 
of those primary elements, and as a result of their combina-
tion. This is called the theory of ‘logical atomism,’ wherein 
each of these ‘atomic’ elements is true or false, indepen-
dently of the others, and can seen as units in a system that 
reveals the truth. “There is one and only one complete 
analysis of the proposition,” 3.25. “The simplest proposition, 
the elementary proposition, asserts the existence of an 
atomic fact,” 4.21.





36. Cf. Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind (New York: Har-
court, 1972).
37. Cf. Willard V. Quine, Quintessence: Basic Readings from the 
Philosophy of W. V. Quine (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 
2008).
38. George Lakoff and Mark Johnston, Philosophy in the Flesh, 
The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought 
(New York: Basic Books, 1999): 447-449.
39. These ideas are explored in: Heidegger, The Question Con-
cerning Technology, and Other Essays (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1982).
40. Michel Foucault / M. Blanchot, Thought From Outside/ 
Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him, trans. J. Mehlman and B. 
Massumi (New York: Zone Books, 1990).
41. “Chatbots Speak,” Telegraph, September 9, 2011, http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/howabout-
that/8752014/Robots-argue-about-God-during-first-
conversation.html (accessed September, 9th, 2011). 
42. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (London: Vintage, 
1968), 477. 
43. Ken Knabb, Situationist International Anthology, trans. 
Ken Knabb (Berkeley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets). “All 
the King’s Men,” originally appeared in Internationale 
Situationniste 8 (Paris, January 1963). See: http://www.
bopsecrets.org/SI/8.kingsmen.htm (accessed October 
8th, 2013). 
44. Alex, Charles, Audrey, Claire, Anjali, Arnaud and other 
‘voices’ synthesized by Bell and AT&T labs recite frag-
ments of Shakespeare, sing, repeat phrases, speak in 
dialect, and use street-smart colloquialisms, in attempt to 
replicate those dimensions of language which go beyond 
its representational functions, but strikingly fail to achieve 
the intricacies and nuances of the human version. For a 
list of synthesized speech samples, from the 1963 on-
wards see: DECtalk 3, Synth, MIT Lab, (1992) http://www.
soundboard.com/sb/Synthesized_Speech_Voices.aspx 
(accessed October 13th, 2013).
45. Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, ed. and trans. 
Susan Hanson (Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), 75. 
46. Ibid.
47. “Siri is an intelligent personal assistant and knowledge 
navigator which works as an application for Apple Inc.’s 
iOS. The application uses a natural language user inter-
face to answer questions, make recommendations, and 
perform actions by delegating requests to a set of Web 
services.” See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siri (accessed 
October 15th, 2013).
48. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. 
G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 
43.
49. “All The King’s Men.” See: http://www.bopsecrets.org/SI/8.
kingsmen.htm, (accessed, October 19th, 2013). “All the 
King’s Men” originally appeared in Internationale Situation-
niste #8 (Paris, January 1963). Translation by Ken Knabb.
50. Mustapha Khayati, ‘”Captive Words: Preface to a Situation-
ist Dictionary.” See: http://www.bopsecrets.org/SI/10.
captivewords.htm, (accessed, October 19, 2013). “Captive 
Words” originally appeared in Internationale Situationniste 
#10 (Paris, January 1966). Translation by Ken Knabb
51. “Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis:” 154–174,
52. Op. Cit. “All The King’s Men.”  
53. Lewis Carroll (Charles L. Dodgson), Through the Looking-
Glass and What Alice Found There, (London: Macmillan, 
1996), 124. (First published, Raleigh, NC: Hayes Barton 
Press, 1872).
2 9 2 2 9 3
